High-Frequency Oscillations in Distributed Neural Networks Reveal the Dynamics of Human Decision Making by Guggisberg, Adrian G. et al.
March 2008  |  Volume 1  |  Article 14  |  www.frontiersin.org
1
High-frequency oscillations in distributed neural networks 
reveal the dynamics of human decision making
Adrian G. Guggisberg1,2,*, Sarang S. Dalal3, Anne M. Findlay1 and Srikantan S. Nagarajan3
1. Biomagnetic Imaging Lab, Department of Radiology, University of California San Francisco (UCSF), San Francisco, CA, USA
2. Department of Neurology, University of Berne, Bern, Switzerland
3.   Joint Graduate Group in Bioengineering, University of California, San Francisco, and University of California Berkeley, USA
Edited by:  Robert T. Knight, University of California Berkeley, USA
Reviewed by:    Francisco Barcelo, University of Illes Balears, Spain
Olivier Bertrand, INSERM, France; University Lyon, France
We examine the relative timing of numerous brain regions involved in human decisions that are based on external criteria, learned 
information, personal preferences, or unconstrained internal considerations. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG) and advanced 
signal analysis techniques, we were able to non-invasively reconstruct oscillations of distributed neural networks in the high-gamma 
frequency band (60–150 Hz). The time course of the observed neural activity suggested that two-alternative forced choice tasks are 
processed in four overlapping stages: processing of sensory input, option evaluation, intention formation, and action execution. 
Visual areas are activated ﬁ  rst, and show recurring activations throughout the entire decision process. The temporo-occipital 
junction and the intraparietal sulcus are active during evaluation of external values of the options, 250–500 ms after stimulus 
presentation. Simultaneously, personal preference is mediated by cortical midline structures. Subsequently, the posterior parietal 
and superior occipital cortices appear to encode intention, with different subregions being responsible for different types of choice. 
The cerebellum and inferior parietal cortex are recruited for internal generation of decisions and actions, when all options have the 
same value. Action execution was accompanied by activation peaks in the contralateral motor cortex. These results suggest that 
high-gamma oscillations as recorded by MEG allow a reliable reconstruction of decision processes with excellent spatiotemporal 
resolution.
Keywords: decision making, choice, magnetoencephalography, time, high-gamma frequency band, source localization, adaptive 
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INTRODUCTION
Choosing plays an important role in our daily life, since it not only reﬂ  ects 
our current environment and internal state, but it also determines our 
future situation. The advent of modern functional brain imaging   methods 
and electrophysiological techniques during the last two decades has 
given us the unprecedented opportunity to investigate the underlying 
neural mechanisms. Different sets of brain areas that mediate choice 
have been revealed and accurate models of neural decision processing 
have been formulated.
It has been shown that rational decision making, during which the 
available information about the eligible options is rationally evaluated 
with regard to their respective value (Montague et  al., 2006; Sanfey 
et al., 2006; Sugrue et al., 2004), is primarily mediated by the parietal 
cortex (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue 
et al., 2004). Some rational decisions – such as choosing a larger sen-
sory stimulus – depend uniquely on the externally given sensory infor-
mation (Romo and Salinas, 2003). Yet, the most conspicuous feature of 
decision making that distinguishes it phenomenologically from reﬂ  exive 
behavior is the faculty of acting not only according to current sensory 
representations of external conditions, but additionally according to 
internal self-related values and preferences (Montague et  al., 2006; 
Sugrue et al., 2004). This internal value-system depends on complex 
neural mechanisms. Correspondingly, imaging studies in humans have 
shown that self-related judgments are associated with an activation of 
cortical midline structures ranging from the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (VMPFC) to the medial parietal cortex (MPC) (Gusnard et al., 2001; 
Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; Zysset et al., 2002). 
In cases of rational uncertainty about the value of the options, healthy 
individuals were found to be capable of making advantageous decisions 
and correct guesses (Bechara et al., 1997; Maia and McClelland, 2004), 
as mediated primarily by prefrontal brain areas (Bechara et al., 1997; 
Elliott et al., 1999). Studies investigating the neural processes underly-
ing internal movement selection reported that the supplementary motor 
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area (SMA) plays a crucial role in these cases (Deiber et al., 1991, 1996; 
Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006; Thaler et al., 1995).
In spite of this large body of knowledge about the localization of brain 
regions mediating decisions, our understanding of human volition and 
decision making is constrained by a lack of information about how the 
temporally distributed activities in spatially distributed neural networks 
are integrated into a coherent decision and action. For instance, although 
we know that cortical midline structures are involved during preference 
judgments (Gusnard et al., 2001; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff 
et al., 2006; Zysset et al., 2002), we are ignorant about the speciﬁ  c role 
of each of these areas (Northoff et al., 2006), and about how and when 
personal preferences inﬂ  uence the decision process. Moreover, although 
we know that explicit memory retrieval is associated with activations 
in dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal cortices (Buckner and Koutstaal, 
1998; Schott et al., 2005), it is unclear how and when memories are inte-
grated into current sensory representations of options and, ultimately, 
into actions. Similarly, although we have detailed knowledge about the 
timing of neural activity in primary motor cortex (MC) and SMA during 
“free” internally generated actions (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Libet 
et al., 1982; Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006; Sochurkova et al., 2006), we 
do not know whether and how these motor areas interact over time with 
sensory and associative areas.
This lack of empirical data is mainly due to inherent limitations of 
the techniques currently used for the assessment of neural activity. 
Functional imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) or positron emission tomography (PET) provide insuf-
ﬁ   cient temporal resolution for reconstructing the dynamics of neural 
activity. Intracerebral electrophysiological methods are unable to record 
simultaneously from multiple distributed brain regions and are rarely pos-
sible in humans. Finally, electroencephalography (EEG) studies relying on 
movement related slow potential shifts such as the Bereitschaftspotential 
(Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965) are only sensitive to neural activity in 
motor areas (MC) (Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006; Sochurkova et al., 2006) 
and often suffer from insufﬁ  cient spatial resolution.
In order to get an integrated picture of the complex spatiotemporal 
interactions among neural systems and networks taking place during 
human decision making, we therefore need techniques that allow us 
to observe the entire human cortex with high resolution in both space 
and time. Magnetoencephalography (MEG) seems to be a promis-
ing tool in this regard. Recent studies of averaged task-evoked ﬁ  elds 
recorded with MEG have yielded new insights into the temporal aspects 
of human perception (Poghosyan and Ioannides, 2007; Poghosyan 
et al., 2005) and decision making (Amano et al., 2006; Periáñez et al., 
2004). Electrocorticographical (ECoG) studies have demonstrated that 
oscillations of neural networks in the “high-gamma” frequency range 
(>60 Hz) are reliable markers of cortical activity that outperform tra-
ditional EEG and fMRI markers in combined spatiotemporal resolution; 
they are spatially more focal and task-speciﬁ  c than slow neural oscil-
lations and event-related potentials (Brovelli et al., 2005; Canolty et al., 
2006; Crone et al., 2006; Edwards et al., 2005), and they correlate with 
the fMRI hemodynamic response (Brovelli et al., 2005; Logothetis et al., 
2001; Niessing et al., 2005) while having much better time resolution. 
Whereas ECoG still has the disadvantage of being invasive and limited 
to a small brain region covered by an electrode grid, there is increas-
ing evidence that neural oscillations, including high-gamma rhythms, can 
be recorded non-invasively and simultaneously from the entire human 
cortex with MEG, and subsequently be reconstructed in space, time, and 
the frequency domain with advanced signal analysis techniques (Dalal 
et al., 2008; Hoogenboom et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2007; Medendorp et al., 
2007; Osipova et al., 2006; Vidal et al., 2006).
In this study, we optimized existing MEG signal analysis methods for 
reconstruction of high-gamma frequency band activity in order to gain 
insights into the spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity during different 
types of decisions. We designed a two-alternative forced choice paradigm 
that allowed us to analyze and compare the neural correlates of rational, 
externally cued and self-related judgments, as well as of “free” internally 
generated choices, while controlling for differences in visual option-stimuli 
and subject responses. In order to study unconstrained internal decisions, 
we confronted the participants with the choice situation posed to Buridan’s 
ass in the famous paradox commonly ascribed to the 14th century philoso-
pher Jean Buridan. The hypothetical rational donkey was unable to choose 
between two equally near, large, and appetizing stacks of hay, and there-
fore faced starvation. It was hoped that this analysis would shed light on 
the neural mechanisms that prevent us from suffering the same fate and 
that enable us to make unconstrained internal decisions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Ten healthy subjects (aged 26–44, 4 females) gave their written informed 
consent to participate in the experiments. All procedures were approved 
by the UCSF Committee on Human Research and conducted in accord-
ance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Recordings
The participants were seated in a magnetically shielded room, while their 
MEG was recorded with a 275 channel whole-head CTF Omega 2000 
system (VSM MedTech, Coquitlam, BC, Canada), using a sampling rate 
of 1200 Hz.
Experimental paradigm
The subjects were asked to perform two-alternative forced choice tasks 
according to 5 different experimental conditions indicated in Table 1. 
Choosing according to external cues was studied by letting the partici-
pants choose between 2 visually presented single digit numbers, either 
the number that was printed in bold (Visual condition) or the number with 
the higher numerical value (Numerical condition). The processing of mem-
ories during a decision task was investigated with an explicit memory 
retrieval paradigm: the participants were instructed to choose the number 
that they had memorized 12–24 hours before the main experiment on a 
list of 5 single digit numbers (Memory condition). The neural integration 
of preferences and internal values into a decision and action was ana-
lyzed by asking the participants to choose the number that they personally 
preferred (Preference condition). In order to study the neural processing 
during choices that are completely independent of external variables and 
determined only by the agent’s current internal state, we confronted the 
participants with 2 exactly identical numbers (Free condition).
Each task condition consisted of 100 trials (in total 500 trials per sub-
ject) with a visual stimulus followed by a button response (Figure 1A). 
During each trial, subjects had to ﬁ  xate a cross in their central visual 
ﬁ  eld, which was presented 0.2 seconds after a 1 kHz warning tone. After 
an interval varying randomly between 1.2 and 1.4 seconds, the ﬁ  xation 
cross disappeared and two single digit numbers were projected 1.5° to 
the left and right of the subject’s central visual ﬁ  eld, respectively. Subjects 
were asked to choose one of the two numbers by pressing a button on 
the corresponding side with their right (dominant) index or middle ﬁ  nger 
within a time interval of 1.2 seconds. Each trial ended with a 750 Hz tone 
signaling the possibility to blink within the next 1.2 seconds (before the 
next warning tone). Motor responses were obtained from the right hand 
only, because we were interested in the cognitive aspects of decision 
making rather than movement selection, and therefore wanted to ensure 
a constant motor response in all conditions and trials. Congruency effects 
due to responses to visual stimuli with the ispilateral vs. contralateral 
hand would have been equally distributed across conditions.
Conditions 1–4 (Table 1) were presented in 4 recurring blocks of 
25 trials each, with a possibility to rest between the blocks as long as 
considered necessary by the subject. Trials of the Free condition were 
randomly interleaved with the other conditions in order to prevent the 
subjects from making their decision before the stimuli were actually 
presented. In addition, subjects were instructed to make their choices Dynamics of decision making
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spontaneously in each Free trial rather than according to preselected pat-
terns, and to press each button overall in about 50% of cases. Incorrect 
responses given in conditions 1–3 were excluded from further analysis. 
The sequence of digits presented in each condition was randomized for 
each subject by a computer.
Behavioral analyses
The response latency was determined for each trial. The randomness 
of the left vs. right choices was assessed by calculating the normalized 
entropy U of all sequences of 5 consecutive responses occurring within 







where S designates all sequences of 5 left/right responses produced by 
the subject, and p is the probability of each combination i (Hopkinson and 
Neuringer, 2003). The resulting U-values are bound between 0 and 1, 
with higher values indicating a higher degree of randomness.
Functional imaging with MEG
Figure 1 shows a ﬂ  owchart of the applied analysis procedures. Neural 
activity during decision making was reconstructed in space and time by 
using a time-frequency beamformer technique (Dalal et al., 2008). An 
adaptive spatial ﬁ  lter (Sekihara et al., 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005; Vrba and 
Robinson, 2001) was used to estimate, at each volume   element (voxel) 
in the brain, the mean oscillation power change across trials between a 
given active and a baseline time window and within a given frequency 
band. Separate ﬁ  lter weights were calculated for each time window of 
200 ms duration and for each frequency band. Active windows were 
shifted in overlapping steps of 50 ms from 0 to 1000 ms after option 
presentation, and each was compared to a baseline period ranging from 
200 to 0 ms before presentation of the options, during which the par-
ticipants attended to a central ﬁ  xation cross. A power increase in the 
frequency bands 60–90, 90–120, and 120–150 Hz was used as an index 
of neural activation. Lower frequency bands (8–30 Hz) were explored in 
single subjects but not used for the main analyses, because the polar-
ity of power changes was ambiguous in these bands. Whereas central 
and parietal areas showed activation induced power decreases up to the 
gamma band, activation in frontal and temporal areas was   sometimes 
Table 1.  Stimulus conditions and behavioral results.
C. No.  Condition  Targeted neural  Instruction  Example  Reaction  Response
   systems      time  (ms)  randomness
1  Visual  Shape processing  Select the number that  33  634 ± 106  0.94 ± 0.02
      is printed in bold
2  Numerical  Shape processing,  Select the number with  37  545 ± 47  0.95 ± 0.02
    numerical processing  a higher numerical value
3  Explicit  Shape processing,  Select the number that  37  731 ± 85  0.95 ± 0.02
  Memory  explicit memory  you have previously memorized
4  Preference  Shape processing,  Select the number that  37  715 ± 100  0.93 ± 0.03
    self-representation  you personally prefer
5  Free  Shape processing,  Select among 2 exactly  33  705 ± 81  0.91 ± 0.05
    internal selection  identicle numbers
Ten healthy subjects were asked to choose between 2 visually presented single digit numbers, according to 5 different choosing criteria, i.e., conditions. 
Twelve to 24 hours before the recording session, they received a list with 5 single digit numbers to memorize and remember during the experiment 
for the Memory condition. According to their choice, the subjects pressed 1 of 2 buttons with their right hand after the reaction times indicated in the 
corresponding column (mean ± standard deviation). The randomness of left-right response sequences produced in each condition is shown in the 
extreme right   column (normalized entropy, mean ± standard deviation on a scale   ranging from 0 to 1).
associated with power increases in the beta band. Moreover, the neigh-
boring frequency bands 30–60 and 150–180 Hz were found to yield 
no additional information in the average maps of all subjects and were 
therefore not included in the main analyses. A multiple spheres head 
model was used. Based on the coregistered structural MRI, individual 
data was spatially normalized to standard MNI (Montreal Neurological 
Institute) voxel space at 5 mm resolution.
Frequency bands. Since there was considerable inter-subject variability 
in the frequency bands that were activated at a given voxel, all 3 high-
gamma bands analyzed were combined to a single time-series as fol-
lows. For each subject, the time-series of each frequency band at each 
voxel were tested against the null-hypothesis of 0 power change by using 
right-tailed t-tests for one sample. Parametric statistical tests were cho-
sen for this analysis step, since the log-transformed power change values 
at a given voxel of a given subject were approximately normally distrib-
uted. Right-tailed hypotheses were used, since we statistically tested 
for activations in the combined 3 frequency bands and therefore had to 
ensure that all bands showed power changes with the same polarity. 
Left-tailed hypotheses would have tested for greater activations during 
the baseline time window, which was not the interest of our study. A 
Bonferroni correction was applied at each voxel and time window to cor-
rect for testing multiple frequency bands (a correction for multiple voxels 
and time windows is applied separately at a later stage, see below). Then, 
the mean power change of frequency bands showing signiﬁ  cant high-
gamma activity was calculated for each voxel and at each time window. 
Voxels that did not have signiﬁ  cant power changes in any frequency band 
were set to 0. This method yielded comparable results as when calculat-
ing the mean of all frequency bands and as when using only one broad 
high-gamma frequency band. However, the statistical method introduced 
here was more sensitive, especially at central and parietal brain regions 
where beta-desynchronization sometimes extended up to the high-
gamma band and interfered with high-gamma activity.
Analysis across subjects. The signiﬁ  cance of the obtained time-series 
of power change in all high-gamma frequency bands was tested across 
subjects with statistical non-parametric mapping (SnPM) (Singh et al., 
2003). SnPM does not depend on a normal distribution of power change 
values across subjects, and allows correcting for the familywise error 
of testing at multiple voxels and time windows. At each time window, Guggisberg et al.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  |  March 2008  |  Volume 1  |  Article 14
4
  average and variance maps across subjects were calculated, and 
the variance maps were spatially smoothed with a 20 × 20 × 20 mm 
Gaussian kernel. From this, a pseudo-t statistic was obtained for each 
voxel and time window. In addition, a distribution of pseudo-t statistics 
was also calculated from 2N permutations of the original N datasets 
(subjects). Each   permutation consisted of two steps: inverting the power 
change values of some subjects (with 2N possible combinations of nega-
tions), and ﬁ  nding the current maximum pseudo-t value among all voxels 
and time windows. Instead of estimating the signiﬁ  cance of each non-
 permuted  pseudo-t value from an assumed normal distribution, it is then 
calculated from the position within the distribution of these maximum 
permuted pseudo-t values. The comparison against maximum values 
effectively corrects for the familywise error of testing multiple voxels 
and time windows. Power change values were thresholded at a cor-
rected p < 0.05.
Contrasts between conditions. A statistical comparison between con-
ditions was performed by subtracting the power change values at each 
voxel, time window, and frequency band. This corresponds to a double 
contrast (active1 – baseline1) – (active2 – baseline2). The difference 
maps were then subjected to the same statistical procedure as used for 
the activation maps.
Software. Spatial normalization was done with the toolbox SPM2 for 
Matlab (http://www.ﬁ  l.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm2/). The algorithms 
for SnPM were adapted from the toolbox SnPM3 for Matlab (http://www.
sph.umich.edu/ni-stat/SnPM/). All analysis algorithms are implemented 
in our Matlab toolbox NUTMEG (Dalal et al., 2004), which can be freely 
downloaded at http://bil.ucsf.edu. Three-dimensional renderings of the 
activation maps were created with the freely available program mri3dX 
written by K. D. Singh (http://imaging.aston.ac.uk/mri3dX/).
Data driven region-of-interest (ROI) analysis
Spatiotemporal activation peaks within the 4-dimensional, averaged, and 
statistically thresholded activation maps were deﬁ  ned by repetitively mov-
ing the center of an observation sphere with 10 to 20 mm radius to the 
maximum value within the sphere’s boundaries and within the entire time 
range until the sphere remained stable. Peaks of all 5 conditions were 
then manually assigned to common ROIs, if they were located in the same 
functional area and within a radius of less than 20 mm. The center of a ROI 
was deﬁ  ned by the centroid of all its peak locations, and the radius was 
deﬁ  ned as 5 mm greater than the distance from the center to the farthest 
peak of a given ROI (15 mm at minimum). The neural   activity of a ROI was 
calculated as the mean power change in dB across its voxels.
Additional statistical analyses
A one-way ANOVA was used to test response latencies, U-values, and ROI 
time-series for differences between conditions. The statistical probabilities 
of differences between ROI time-series were corrected for testing multiple 
time windows with a false discovery rate of 10% (Genovese et al., 2002).
RESULTS
Behavioral data
The mean response time of all subjects and of all 5 experimental condi-
tions is shown in Table 1. There was a signiﬁ  cant difference between 
conditions [F(4,45) = 8.0,  p <  0.0001], but in a pairwise comparison 
only the Numerical condition differed signiﬁ  cantly from other conditions 
(p < 0.05, Tukey-Kramer HSD). The left/right responses showed a high 
degree of randomness for all conditions (U-values >0.9, Table 1), with no 
signiﬁ  cant difference between conditions [F(4,45) = 1.5, p = 0.21].
Spatiotemporal reconstruction of neural activity
Active brain areas (relative to baseline) and their time courses were recon-
structed from increases in MEG oscillations in the high-gamma range, 
Figure 1. Flowchart of study paradigm, applied signal analyses, and 
statistical procedures. Example images from the Preference condition are 
shown. (A) Ten healthy volunteers performed visuo-motor, two-alternative, 
forced choice tasks as shown in Table 1. Oscillation power changes were 
calculated relative to a baseline before presentation of the options for a series 
of moving time windows after presentation of the options, and for each of 
the frequency bands 60–90, 90–120, and 120–150 Hz. (B) A set of adap-
tive spatial ﬁ  lters was used to reconstruct the sources of power changes 
at each voxel, time window, and frequency band from the recordings of all 
MEG   sensors. For contrasts between condition pairs, the difference in power 
changes between the conditions at each time-frequency point was used: 
(active1–baseline1) – (active2–baseline2). (C) For each voxel, the frequency 
band(s) that showed signiﬁ  cant power increases across time were selected 
and averaged. (D) The spatially normalized power change values at each 
voxel and at each time window were averaged across subjects and (E) statis-
tically thresholded with statistical non-parametric mapping (SnPM).Dynamics of decision making
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between 60 and 150 Hz, using an adaptive spatial ﬁ  ltering   technique 
(Sekihara et  al., 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005; Vrba and Robinson, 2001). 
All decision conditions elicited complex spatiotemporal brain activation 
patterns, the dynamics of which are shown in real time in Video S1a–e 
(supplementary material can be found at http://www.mrsc.ucsf.edu/
∼aguggis/frontiers/suppinfo.html). Video S2a–e presents the same data in 
30× slow motion, and with the anatomical locations of all spatiotemporal 
activation peaks labeled. Figure 2 gives a static overview of the cortical 
areas with signiﬁ  cant activations during different decision stages and in 
each of the 5 conditions, and shows that, as expected, numerous and spa-
tially distributed neural systems are required for choosing tasks, including 
primary and associative visual areas, prefrontal areas, the limbic system, 
the parietal cortex, the motor and premotor cortex, and the SMA. The spa-
tiotemporal pattern of neural activity during decisions was also visualized 
by deﬁ  ning ROIs from activation peaks in each of the conditions, and dis-
playing the resulting average time-series of each ROI in Figure 3.
All conditions ﬁ   rst induced activation in the medial occipital cor-
tex (MOC) of Brodmann area (BA) 17/18, peaking 200 ms after visual 
presentation of the options. With the exception of the Numerical condi-
tion, all conditions also showed activation around the temporo-occipital 
  junction (TOJ; BA 19, 37, 39, and 22) and the occipito-parietal junction 
(OPJ; BA 18, 19, and 7) peaking within 250 ms after stimulus presen-
tation. In contrast, the Numerical condition elicited an early activation 
of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; BA 6). Additional early 
activation peaks (∼200 ms) could be found in the right superior parietal 
lobule (SPL; BA 7) during Memory judgments, and in the left supraparietal 
lobule/intraparietal sulcus (SPL/IPS; BA 7) as well as in the left cerebellar 
(Cb) hemisphere during Free decisions.
Subsequently, various brain regions showed an activity peak dur-
ing a  time window between 250 and 500  ms after option presenta-
tion, depending on the choice condition, suggesting a second stage of 
choice processing. All conditions elicited activity peaks in supplementary 
motor area (SMA; BA 6) and right motor cortex (MC; BA 4 and 6), as 
well as reactivations of TOJ and OPJ, with no signiﬁ  cant intensity differ-
ences between conditions in these regions during this stage. Moreover, 
additional speciﬁ  c activations were observed in the Visual, Numerical, 
Memory and Preference conditions. In the Visual condition, the superior 
parietal lobule/intraparietal sulcus (SPL/IPS) was activated on both sides; 
in the Numerical condition, activations were seen only in the left IPS. The 
Explicit Memory condition was associated with activation in right DLPFC 
(BA 6 and 8). During the Preference condition, activations were observed 
in cortical midline structures progressing from medial parietal cortex 
(MPC; BA 7 and 31) to supragenual anterior cingulate cortex (SACC, BA 
24 and 32; see Video S2d), as well as in left DLPFC (BA 6 and 8). The Free 
condition showed reactivations of the left cerebellar (Cb) hemisphere and 
the left SPL, as well as activation of the right posterior inferior parietal 
lobule (IPL; BA 39).
In a third stage, (re-)activations of parietal and occipital brain areas 
peaking between 500 and 600  ms after presentation of the options 
occurred, with each condition being associated with a distinct subset 
of parieto-occipital regions (Figure 2, Video S2a–e): the Visual condition 
with the MPC (BA 7) and the left IPL (BA 40); the Numerical condition with 
the MPC (BA 7); the Memory condition with the right IPL (BA 40), left SPL, 
and left OPJ; the Preference condition with the left IPL (BA 40), left SPL, 
and bilateral OPJ; and the Free condition with the left IPL (BA 40) and 
the right SPL/OPJ (BA 7 and 19). Furthermore, the Cb showed activation 
peaks during this time window in all conditions. During preference judg-
ments, the activity in the cortical midline structures migrated further in an 
anterior direction, and induced a peak in the pregenual anterior cingulate 
cortex (PACC; BA 32), as visualized in  Figure 3.
Finally, activity in the left (contralateral) premotor and primary MC 
that has been building up during the second and third processing stages 
  converges in the precentral gyrus (BA 4) and peaks between 550 and 
650 ms after stimulus presentation in all conditions, about 50 ms before 
the average button press latency of the subjects (Table 1). During and 
immediately after the button press, the Preference and Free conditions 
were additionally associated with reactivations of the SMA, the left SPL/
IPS, and the SACC (Figure 3), which were signiﬁ  cantly greater than in 
the other conditions (p < 0.05, corrected). Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC; BA 11) was signiﬁ  cantly activated only during the Free condition, 
and only after the activation peak in the motor cortex (Figures 2 and 3, 
Video S2e).
The MNI coordinates of all spatiotemporal activation peaks are 
indicated in Table S1 (http://www.mrsc.ucsf.edu/∼aguggis/frontiers/ 
suppinfo.html).
Contrasts
In order to better isolate the neural networks being speciﬁ  cally involved 
during the different choosing conditions, we additionally performed four 
planned statistical comparisons between condition pairs. The Numerical, 
Memory, Preference, and Free conditions were each contrasted to the 
Visual condition, since we hypothesized that the former four condi-
tions each relied on one or several neural systems in addition to visual 
shape processing required for the Visual condition (Table 1). Figure 4 
Figure 2. Spatiotemporal reconstruction of synchronized high-gamma activity during choosing. Average activation maps of 10 healthy subjects are 
superimposed on a 3-dimensional template brain. Colored brain areas show the reconstructed sources of signiﬁ  cant (corrected p < 0.05, SnPM) high-gamma 
activity during the 5 task conditions. Rows represent different stages in the decision process.Guggisberg et al.
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Figure 3.  Time course of induced high-gamma power in regions of interest (ROI). ROIs were derived from spatiotemporal activity peaks in all 5 choosing 
conditions. Occipital areas showed the ﬁ  rst activity peaks, but were also reactivated later in the decision process. The DLPFC contributed to preference and 
memory judgments during the option evaluation stage of choosing. Activity in cortical midline structures was most prominent during the Preference condition, 
and progressed over time from posterior to anterior parts. Parietal regions showed consistent activity peaks during the intention stage of choosing, with the 
intentions being mediated by a distinct set of posterior parietal and superior occipital subregions for each condition. Activity in the bilateral MC started to build 
up immediately after visual presentation of the options, and peaked roughly 50 ms before the average behavioral button press latency. High-gamma power 
changes in the SMA were of similar intensity for all conditions during the option evaluation stage of choosing, but became signiﬁ  cantly greater in the Preference 
and Free condition than in the other conditions during and after action execution.Dynamics of decision making
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  displays the location and time course of activations that were speciﬁ  c 
to each   condition. The dynamics of the activation differences are shown 
in Video S3 (real time) and S4 (30× slow motion with labels). Numerical 
choices induced a speciﬁ  c activation of the left IPL (BA 40) 250 ms after 
option presentation, as well as of the left IPS/OPJ (BA 7/19) and right 
DLPFC (BA 9) 450 ms after option presentation. Explicit memory retrieval 
and memory judgments were associated with speciﬁ   c   sequential 
  activations of right DLPFC (BA 8), left DLPFC (BA 8), and the right IPL 
(BA 40). The contrast Preference > Visual condition showed signiﬁ  cantly 
greater high-gamma activity in the SACC (BA 24) and left DLPFC (BA 8) 
peaking 450 ms after stimulus onset, and in the right SPL (BA 7) peaking 
650 ms after stimulus onset. Finally, the Free condition was associated 
with a signiﬁ  cantly larger activation of, in chronological order, the left IPL 
(BA 40), the left DLPFC (BA 8), the right posterior IPL (BA 39), and the left 
Cb, than the Visual condition. In contrast, the Visual condition depended 
on a greater activation of the right IPS (BA 7), the left fusiform gyrus 
(FusG; BA 37), and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; BA 11) than the 
Free condition.
The MNI coordinates of regions with signiﬁ  cant contrast between 
condition pairs are listed in Table S2.
DISCUSSION
In an attempt to obtain a more integrated and dynamic picture of the neural 
processes underlying visuo-motor choosing tasks in humans, this study 
used MEG recordings of neural oscillations in the high-gamma frequency 
band and advanced signal analysis techniques to reconstruct the activ-
ity of the entire cortex with high resolution in both space and time. This 
approach has the potential limitation that the inference of brain sources 
from MEG data has no unique solution and depends on assumptions 
that introduce uncertainty about the correctness of the results. However, 
previous studies have demonstrated the reliability of the applied signal 
analysis techniques (Dalal et al., 2008; Sekihara et al., 2005), and we 
will show in the following sections that the location of brain activations 
found in this study are largely in accordance with previous fMRI and PET 
studies, which conﬁ  rms the validity of our results. Moreover, the improved 
temporal resolution allowed us to disambiguate the speciﬁ  c role of differ-
ent brain areas, particularly of subregions in parietal, frontal, and limbic 
cortex, and to determine how and when sensory information, memories, 
and preferences are integrated to decisions and actions.
Timing and interpretation of choice-related neural activity
Choosing requires an integration of multiple sensory inputs to a single 
output of intention and action. “Cartesian” models of decision mak-
ing have long assumed that decisions are processed sequentially, with 
a sensory representation of the options occurring in a ﬁ  rst stage, and 
mental/neural processing as well as motor output occurring in succes-
sive stages (Glimcher, 2003). The pattern and time course of cerebral 
activity observed in our study can indeed be conceptually divided into 4 
distinct but overlapping stages (rows in Figure 2). It is, however, note-
worthy that most brain regions did not show a monophasic time course 
of activation, but rather complex patterns of recurring activation peaks, 
which is in accordance with previous studies (Periáñez et al., 2004). For 
instance, activation of sensory (visual) networks was not limited to the 
early perceptive stage of choosing, but could be observed throughout 
the entire decision process including during the button press. Moreover, 
the high-gamma power increase in the MC and SMA also started sev-
eral hundred milliseconds before the actual ﬁ  nger movement, which is 
in agreement with previous Bereitschaftspotential studies (Kornhuber 
and Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 1982; Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006), and 
which suggests that motor areas actively participate in the perceptive 
decision stages that precede an action rather than being merely respon-
sible for its execution. Indeed, recent data has shown that perception of 
action-related stimuli activates both sensory and motor networks in par-
allel (Lahav et al., 2007; Pizzamiglio et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005). 
Thus, although the neural processing of decisions occurs in sequential 
cognitive steps, sensory, motor, and associative networks seem to acti-
vate mostly in parallel (Freeman, 1997; Varela et al., 1992).
We observed four stages of choice-related brain activation. During 
the ﬁ  rst stage, primary and associative visual cortices showed activa-
tion peaks, suggesting a perception and processing of the sensory input 
(“stimulus processing stage”). Similarly as in previous event related 
potential/ﬁ  eld (ERP/ERF) studies (Poghosyan and Ioannides, 2007), we 
observed a progression of activity from the MOC around V1 to   associative 
Figure 4.  Comparison of high-gamma activity between choosing condi-
tions. The 3-dimensional maps show areas with signiﬁ  cant differences in 
high-gamma activity between condition pairs of 10 healthy subjects. The line 
plots display the time course of power differences in the region marked with 
corresponding color.Guggisberg et al.
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visual areas (Videos S1 and S2). It is, however, noteworthy that high-
gamma power peaks in the visual cortex were reached only about 
200 ms after presentation of the visual stimulus, i.e., considerably later 
than the activity peaks observed with evoked potentials/ﬁ  elds in humans 
(Poghosyan and Ioannides, 2007; Poghosyan et al., 2005) and cortical 
recordings in monkeys (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000). The gamma activ-
ity during this stage therefore seems to include both early and late visual 
processes.
In the second stage, we observed neural activation peaks in a wide 
variety of brain areas, depending on the experimental condition, which 
we interpret as an evaluation of the value of each option according to 
different choosing criteria (“option evaluation stage”). These criteria 
include external features as well as memories and internal personal 
preferences.
In the third stage, we found activation peaks in parietal brain areas, 
which, according to previous studies, mediate processing of intentions 
and action planning (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Chapman et al., 2007; 
Connolly et al., 2003), thus suggesting that the available information is 
integrated and actions are prepared during this step (“intention stage”). 
While it is well established that different subregions of the posterior pari-
etal cortex are dedicated to the planning of different actions, e.g., eye 
movements, reaching movements, or grasping movements (Andersen 
and Buneo, 2002; Connolly et al., 2003), we also observed activations in 
a distinct set of subregions in posterior parietal cortex and OPJ for each 
choosing condition (Figure 2), even though the prepared actions as well 
as the hand positions were exactly the same for all of them. This suggests 
a functional specialization of the parietal cortex depending not only on 
action parameters and the sensory representation of spatial coordinates 
(Andersen and Buneo, 2002), but also on the cognitive context.
Finally, in the last stage, activation peaks occurred in the contralateral 
sensorimotor cortex corresponding to the execution of a button press 
(“action execution stage”).
Value constrained decisions
Conditions 1–4 of our study represented rational decision types, which 
differed with regard to the neural systems required to choose, whereas 
the perceived stimuli (single digit numbers) and the actions (button press) 
were kept the same (Table 1). In contrast to the Visual and Numerical 
conditions, the Explicit Memory and Preference conditions depended on 
internal neural representations of personal preferences and memories in 
addition to the processing of external stimuli. Thus, our setup enabled us 
to study the neural networks that are primarily responsible for internally 
motivated as compared to externally cued choices.
Our results show essentially the same spatial activation pattern as 
previous fMRI and PET studies, but additionally demonstrate that memo-
ries and preferences are processed during the same early decision stage 
as information coming from external sensory stimuli. The Visual condi-
tion was associated with early activations in the TOJs (particularly the 
left FusG; see Figure 4), which are thought to mediate shape recognition 
(Fujimaki et al., 1999; Fulbright et al., 2003; Op de Beeck et al., 2000), 
with the peak activity occurring between 250 and 400 ms after stimu-
lus onset (Figure 2). The Numerical condition induced activity peaks 
within 400 ms after presentation of the options in right DLPFC and left 
IPL (Figures 2 and 4), which have previously been related to numerical 
processing (Fulbright et al., 2003; Pinel et al., 1999; Zago and Tzourio-
Mazoyer, 2002). Both external conditions (Visual and Numerical) also 
showed early activations in the SPL/IPS on both sides, which ﬁ  ts well 
with the notion that these cortical areas are important in determining 
stimulus magnitude (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005; Fulbright et al., 2003; 
Kaufmann et al., 2005) and for encoding the relative value of each option 
(Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004). Similarly, bilateral activ-
ity in DLPFC, which is related to explicit memory retrieval (Buckner and 
Koutstaal, 1998; Schott et al., 2005), and in cortical midline structures, 
which mediate preference judgments (Gusnard et al., 2001; Northoff and 
Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; Zysset et al., 2002), peaked in the 
same time range between 250 and 400 ms after stimulus presentation 
(Figures 3 and 4). Thus, our results demonstrate that memories and 
preferences inﬂ  uence the decision in a similar manner as choice-related 
external cues, with all of them being evaluated with regard to the relative 
value of each option by specialized brain regions during a time window of 
250 to 500 ms after presentation of the options.
Activations in cortical midline structures during preference judgments 
were found to begin in MPC and then to migrate in an anterior direction 
along the cingulate gyrus up to its pregenual part (Figures 2 and 3). 
This time course suggests that the posterior and supragenual parts of 
cortical midline structures might be mostly concerned with evaluation of 
options with regard to self-related internal values, whereas the pregenual 
part could be more involved in preparation and execution of self-related 
actions.
Unconstrained internal decisions
Although preference judgments allow us “to act as we will and to act 
differently if we had willed differently” and thus fulﬁ  ll John Locke’s 
inﬂ  uential deﬁ  nition of freedom (Locke, 1975), it is generally agreed 
that the “will” for an action, i.e., the preferences underlying prefer-
ence judgments, are, at least in part, (pre-)determined by environmen-
tal conditions and past experience (Montague et al., 2006; Strawson, 
1986; Sugrue et al., 2004), and hence not freely chosen. In contrast, 
the “Buridan’s ass” paradigm used for our Free condition allowed us 
to study choices that were completely unconstrained by external cues 
or predetermined internal preferences, and depended only on current 
internal considerations. In order to further verify that the study par-
ticipants indeed made their decisions independent of systematic inﬂ  u-
ences for this condition, we analyzed the randomness of the response 
sequences produced by the participants. The observed values of nor-
malized entropy were high and statistically not distinguishable from the 
sequences observed in the rational conditions, which in turn depended 
on computer-randomized stimulus sequences. The behavioral data thus 
suggested that the decisions in this condition were indeed spontaneous 
and unconstrained. We can, however, not exclude the possibility that 
– despite instructions to choose spontaneously in each trial – some 
subjects applied predeﬁ  ned rules in this condition, which escaped the 
randomness measure applied here.
The results in Figure 4, Video S3d, and Video S4d show that the 
left cerebellar hemisphere and the IPL on both sides were the most 
prominently activated areas during unconstrained internal compared 
to externally cued decisions, which is in agreement with a previous 
PET study using a similar experimental paradigm [“None” condition 
in (Deiber et al., 1996)]. The Cb and the IPL were also found to be 
important during decision making under uncertainty and probabilistic 
inference tasks (Blackwood et al., 2004; Elliott et al., 1999), which are 
different from our paradigm in that our Free condition required choices 
among alternatives with known equal value rather than among alterna-
tives with different but uncertain value. The common activation of the 
Cb and IPL in both choice situations therefore suggests that they might 
be involved in the internal generation of choice and intention in the 
absence of sufﬁ  cient information from external sources, past experi-
ence, and internal preferences. This conclusion is also supported by 
their activation time courses with peaks during the “evaluation” and 
“intention” stages.
In order to exclude the possibility that the participants made their 
unconstrained decisions before seeing the options, we randomly inter-
leaved all trials of the Free condition within the blocks of the other condi-
tions. The speciﬁ  c activity observed in this condition could therefore also 
partly reﬂ  ect task switching and ﬁ  rst trial effects (Konishi et al., 1998, 
2001; Periáñez et al., 2004; Rubinstein et al., 2001). However, in the 
absence of corresponding behavioral evidence or imaging data, we con-
sider this possibility unlikely. Task-switching effects are typically associ-
ated with longer response latencies. We did not observe greater response 
times in the Free condition than in most other conditions (Table 1), nor Dynamics of decision making
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in the trials following Free tasks [t(9) = 0.24, p = 0.82]. Moreover, set 
  shifting and ﬁ  rst trial effects have consistently been reported to induce 
robust activity in the bilateral inferior frontal gyri (Konishi et al., 1998, 
2001; Periáñez et al., 2004), which was not the case in our Free task con-
dition. On the contrary, more activation could be observed in the Visual 
condition than in the Free condition (Figure 4), although it required less 
task switching.
At variance with studies of decision making under uncertainty 
(Bechara et al., 1997; Blackwood et al., 2004; Elliott et al., 1999), we did 
not ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant activation of VMPFC during the decision stages of 
unconstrained internal choices, and only a weak activation during the 
action execution stage. This supports the notion that VMPFC is involved in 
probabilistic reasoning and outcome monitoring (Blackwood et al., 2004; 
Elliott et al., 1999), which are important for rationally uncertain but less 
for rationally indeterminate decisions.
The greater activation in left DLPFC during early stages of rationally 
inderminate decisions most likely reﬂ  ects working memory processes 
required for creating left-right response sequences (Lau et al., 2004b).
It is a matter of long-standing debate whether “Buridan’s ass” type 
decisions as studied here represent manifestations of a “will power” 
(Hodgson, 1999; O’Connor, 1995; Reid, 1969) or merely (pseudo-)ran-
dom processes (Strawson, 1986). Our results do not resolve this issue. 
However, the ﬁ  nding that the generation of unconstrained internal choices 
is associated with an activation of specialized brain regions cannot eas-
ily be explained by random ﬂ  uctuations in value encoding networks, but 
rather favors models that assume specialized neural networks responsi-
ble for internal choosing and reasoning.
Decision-related preparatory activity
In agreement with the notion that SMA subregions are important for 
action preparation, we found an activation of the SMA during the “evalu-
ation” and “intention” stages in all conditions. However, whereas previ-
ous studies have observed a greater SMA activation during preparation 
of internally generated movements (Deiber et al., 1991, 1996; Shibasaki 
and Hallett, 2006) and during preference judgments (Lau et al., 2004b) 
than during externally cued movements and choices, we did not observe 
a signiﬁ  cantly greater activation of the SMA in the Free and Preference 
conditions than in the other conditions before action execution. We argue 
that this discrepancy is due to different experimental paradigms used 
in different studies, as well as to different temporal resolutions of the 
applied analysis techniques.
The internal movement generation and selection paradigms used in 
most previous studies did not involve any sensory processing of options 
and sensory-motor integration, but depended only on motor planning and 
execution, whereas the externally cued conditions required an evaluation 
of sensory cues. Similarly, all choosing conditions studied here required 
that the subjects inspected and integrated the visual appearance of the 
options before preparing an action. The different structures found to 
be important in our and previous studies could therefore reﬂ  ect differ-
ences in sensory-motor integration. The SMA seems to be responsible 
for general action preparation and execution, and, speciﬁ  cally, for motor 
selection and movement initiation in the absence of sensory processing. 
Conversely, if an evaluation of sensory information is necessary for the 
choice, then the parietal cortex and the Cb seem to be more suitable for 
unconstrained internal decisions, possibly due to their abundant struc-
tural connections with both sensory and motor areas.
Rather than before the action, we found a reactivation of the SMA, the 
SACC, and of parietal areas that was speciﬁ  c and limited to the Preference 
and  Free conditions (Figure 3), during and after action execution. A 
similar differential time course of the SMA has also been reported in a 
recent time-resolved fMRI study [Figure 5 in Cunnington et al. (2006)]. In 
agreement with Cunnington et al., we therefore suggest that signiﬁ  cant 
contrasts between preference judgments and externally cued decisions 
in the SMA (Lau et al., 2004b) are mostly due to differences occurring 
during and after the corresponding action.
Postdiction of internal decisions
The greater activation of the SMA, SACC, and parietal areas during and 
after execution of internally generated actions suggests that an important 
feature of internal decisions is speciﬁ  c neural processing taking place 
during and after the corresponding action. This retrospective assessment 
might be related to evaluation of causality and the awareness that the 
preceding action was internally generated. Previous studies have indeed 
shown that the SMA, SACC, and parietal regions are important for report-
ing the subjective timing of internally produced intentions and actions 
(Lau et al., 2004a, 2006; Sirigu et al., 2004). Moreover, the percept of an 
event was found to be a function of what happens in the ∼80 ms after the 
event (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000), and transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation of the SMA after execution of spontaneous actions was reported to 
be capable of disturbing perception of the timing of intentions (Lau et al., 
2007). Therefore, awareness of intention timing seems to be fully estab-
lished only after execution of the corresponding action, in agreement with 
the time course of neural activity observed here.
Deep brain structures
Decision making depends not only on the cerebral cortex, but is also 
mediated by deep brain structures such as the basal ganglia (Balleine 
et al., 2007; Seymour et al., 2007). Due to the greater distance of deep 
nuclei to the MEG sensors with resulting spatial blur and low signal-to-
noise ratio, we are currently reluctant to use MEG based methods for the 
study of these structures. Moreover, the adaptive spatial ﬁ  lters used for 
source reconstruction tend to erroneously localize highly correlated and 
spatially distributed neural activity in the middle of the brain (Sekihara 
et al., 2002, 2004, 2005). The signiﬁ  cant activations in the thalamus and 
brain stem shown in Figure 2 could therefore represent artifacts intro-
duced by the source reconstruction technique rather than true brain activ-
ity. On the other hand, we are convinced that the reconstructed sources in 
the depth of the cingulate gyrus are real, because they follow exactly the 
complex anatomical shape of the cingulate gyrus, and are speciﬁ  c to the 
Preference task condition (Figure 2). Previous studies have also reported 
trustworthy MEG reconstructions of neural activity in the amygdala (Luo 
et al., 2007). Future work will have to assess the anatomical limits of 
MEG techniques for reconstructing deep brain sources.
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